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I. INTRODUCTION
Throughout its relatively short history, American law has placed a
special value on the rights of real property owners. Often, the law
protected these rights in a way that made land use seem more like a
civil liberty than a social resource.' One way the common law pro-
tected property rights was by limiting landowners and occupiers' tort
liability when entrants were harmed on the land. Limiting tort liabil-
ity allowed landowners to use their land in any manner they chose,
thus protecting valuable property rights. Yet, as American ideas
about the value of property have begun to change,2 so too have the
Copyright held by NEBRAsKA LAW REvIEw.
1. JAMms H. KuNsTER, THE GEOGRAPHY OF NowHEre: THE RISE AND DECLINE OF
AMERICA'S MAN-MADE LANDSCAPE 26 (1993).
2. Just v. Marinette County, 201 N.W.2d 761, 768 (Wis. 1972)("An owner of land has
no absolute and unlimited right to change the essential natural character of his
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laws regarding tort liability of owners and occupiers. Nebraska recog-
nized this tort reform in Heins v. Webster County.8
InHeins, the plaintiff, Mr. Heins, injured his back when he slipped
at the front entrance to Webster County Hospital in Red Cloud, Ne-
braska. Heins was leaving the hospital after visiting his daughter,
who was employed as a nurse at the hospital. Because his was merely
a social visit, under existing Nebraska law Mr. Heins was a licensee
and was denied recovery. The Nebraska Supreme Court held, how-
ever, that the distinction between licensees and invitees should be
abolished and replaced by a reasonable standard of care for all lawful
entrants.
The decision in Heins will dramatically affect premises liability law
in Nebraska. Under Heins, the common law distinction between licen-
sees and invitees is no longer solely determinative of the duty an
owner or occupier owes to an entrant upon his land. Instead, licensees
and invitees are now entitled to a reasonable standard of care under
the circumstances. Trespassers, however, remain subject to the com-
mon law classification system.
This Note will examine how the Heins decision beneficially
changed Nebraska law. Abolishing the common law status distinc-
tions and applying a reasonable standard of care under the circum-
stances frees the court from the harshness of the common law and the
problems of rigid application. A reasonable standard of care also more
fully exemplifies modern social values. This Note will further show
that the Heins decision was merely a step in the right direction for the
court. To fully ameliorate the harmful effects of the common law cate-
gories, the court also should eliminate the status category of tres-
passer and should instead apply a single duty of reasonable care
under the circumstances in all premises liability situations.
II. BACKGROUND
Although most negligence law is based on the belief that one owes
a duty of reasonable care to others,4 owners and occupiers of land tra-
ditionally have not been held to this standard of care. Instead, at com-
mon law, owners and occupiers of land owed a duty of care based on
the status of the entrant.5 Entrants historically were classified as in-
vitees, licensees, or trespassers. An invitee is generally defined as a
person who is expressly or implicitly invited to enter or remain on the
land for a purpose connected with the business dealings of the posses-
land so as to use it for a purpose for which it was unsuited in its natural state and
which injures the rights of others.").
3. 250 Neb. 750, 552 N.W.2d 51 (1996).
4. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAw oF ToRs § 31 (5th ed.
1984).
5. Id. § 58; 3 STUART M. SPEIsER ET. AL., THE AmERICAN LAW OF ToRm § 14:3 (1986).
19971
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
sor of the land,6 and is owed a duty of reasonable care. 7 A licensee is
generally defined as a person who is privileged to enter or remain on
land only by virtue of the possessor's express or implied consent.8 An
owner or occupier owes to a licensee a duty to warn of any unreasona-
ble hidden conditions.9 A trespasser generally is defined as one who
enters or remains upon land in the possession of another without a
privilege created by the possessor's consent or otherwise.O A tres-
passer is owed only the duty to refrain from intentional willful or wan-
ton conduct."1
These status distinctions originated in England.2 and were incor-
porated into American common law. The status distinctions likely re-
sulted from the strong emphasis early English society placed on land
ownership.1S The distinctions perhaps also reflect intangible social
values inherited from feudal times.14 The categories reflect the idea
that a landowner should have the freedom to use his land in any way
he chooses.15 Modern society, however, is no longer based on landed
property or feudal values. In 1957, England recognized the moderni-
zation of society and values by abolishing the distinction between
licensees and invitees.' 6
American jurisdictions also have questioned the common law cate-
gories. In 1959, the United States Supreme Court soundly criticized
the. distinctions in Kermarec v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique
and refused to incorporate the distinctions into admiralty law.17 The
landmark American decision appeared in 1968, when the California
6. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 332 (1965).
7. Id. § 341A.
8. Id. § 330.
9. Id. § 341.
10. Id. § 329.
11. Id. § 333.
12. Kermarec v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 358 U.S. 625, 630 (1959); 2
FOWLER V. HARPER & FLEMING JAMES, JR., THE LAW OF TORTS § 27.1 (1956). See
JOSEPH A. PAGE, THE LAW OF PREMISES ILAmurrY § 6.1, at 129 n.1 (1988).
13. 2 HARPER & JINXEs, supra note 12, § 27.1. See Norman S. Marsh, The History and
Comparative Law of Invitees, Licensees, and Trespassers, 69 L.Q. REv. 182, 184-
85 (1953).
14. 2 HARPER & JAMEs, supra note 12, § 27.1; PAGE, supra note 12, § 2.1.
15. 2 HARPER & JAMES, supra note 12, § 27.1; FRANcIs H. BOHLEN, STUDIES IN THE
LAw or TORTS 163-90 (1926).
16. Occupier's Liability Act of 1957, 5 & 6 Eliz. 2, ch. 31 (Eng.). See generally Doug-
las Payne, Occupier's Liability Act, 21 MOD. L. Ev. 359 (1958).
17. Kermarec v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 358 U.S. 625, 630-31 (1959)
("Yet even within a single jurisdiction, the classifications and subclassifications
bred by the common law have produced confusion and conflict. As new distinc-
tions have been spawned, older ones have become obscured. Through this seman-
tic morass the common law has moved, unevenly and with hesitation, towards
'imposing on owners and occupiers a single duty of reasonable care in all the cir-
cumstances.'")(footnote omitted)(quoting Kermeric v. Compagnie Transatlan-
tique, 254 F.2d 175, 180 (2nd Cir. 1957XClark, C.J., dissenting).
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Supreme Court abolished the distinction between invitees, licensees,
and trespassers in Rowland v. Christian.18 Rowland went further
than the English Parliament; Rowland eliminated all three catego-
ries, refusing to maintain a separate classification for trespassers.
Since 1968, eleven jurisdictions have followed Rowland and com-
pletely abolished the common law classifications.' 9 Another ten juris-
dictions have followed the English lead and taken an intermediate
position, abolishing the classifications of invitee and licensee while re-
taining a separate classification for trespassers. 20 Several other juris-
dictions have altered the common law categories significantly via case
law2 ' or legislative act.22 The majority of American states have, how-
ever, either expressly retained the common law distinctions or de-
clined to abolish them.23
18. 443 P.2d 561, 568 (Cal. 1968)("Reasonable people do not ordinarily vary their
conduct depending upon such matters, and to focus upon the status of the injured
party as a trespasser, licensee, or invitee in order to determine the question
whether the landowner has a duty of care, is contrary to our modem social mores
and humanitarian values.").
19. Smith v. Arbaugh's Restaurant, Inc., 469 F.2d 97 (D.C. Cir. 1972)(applying Dis-
trict of Columbia law), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 939 (1973); Webb v. City & Borough
of Sitka, 561 P.2d 731 (Alaska 1977); Mile High Fence Co. v. Radovich, 489 P.2d
308 (Colo. 1971); Pickard v. City & County of Honolulu, 452 P.2d 445 (Haw.
1969); Cope v. Doe, 464 N.E.2d 1023 (Ill. 1984)(eliminating the common law dis-
tinctions only as to child entrants upon land); Cates v. Beauregard Elec. Coop.,
Inc., 328 So. 2d 367 (La. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 833 (1976); Limberhand v.
Big Ditch Co., 706 P.2d 491 (Mont. 1985); Moody v. Manny's Auto Repair, 871
P.2d 935 (Nev. 1994); Oullette v. Blanchard, 364 A.2d 631 (N.H. 1976); Basso v.
Miller, 352 N.E.2d 868 (N.Y. 1976); Mariorenzi v. Joseph Diponte, Inc., 333 A.2d
127 (R.I. 1975)(but see Tantimonico v. Allendale Mut. Ins. Co., 637 A.2d 1056 (R.I.
1994)(restoring status category of trespasser)).
20. Jones v. Hanson, 867 P.2d 303 (Kan. 1994); Ford v. Board of County Comm'rs.,
879 P.2d 766 (N.M. 1994); O'Leary v. Coenen, 251 N.W.2d 746 (N.D. 1977); Pou-
lin v. Colby College, 402 A.2d 846 (Me. 1979); Mounsey v. Ellard, 297 N.E.2d 43
(Mass. 1973); Peterson v. Balack, 199 N.W.2d 639 (Minn. 1972); Ragnone v. Port-
land Sch. Dist. No. 1J, 633 P.2d 1287 (Or. 1981); Hudson v. Gaiten, 675 S.W.2d
699 (Tenn. 1984); Antoniewicz v. Reszczynski, 236 N.W.2d 1 (Wis. 1975); Clarke
v. Beckwith, 858 P.2d 293 (Wyo. 1993).
21. For example, Missouri and Kentucky apply a duty of reasonable care once the
presence of a visitor is known. Hardin v. Harris, 507 S.W.2d 172 (Ky. 1974);
Taylor v. Union Elec. Co., 826 S.W.2d 57 (Mo. App. 1992). Indiana and Maine
consider a social guest an invitee. Burrell v. Meads, 569 N.E.2d 637 (Ind. 1991);
Ferguson v. Bretton, 375 A.2d 225 (Me. 1977).
22. Connecticut also considers social guest to be invitees. CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 52-557(a) (West 1991). Illinois abolished the status distinctions by legislation.
ILL. Comp. STAT. ANN. ch. 740, para. 130/2 (Smith-Hurd 1993 & Supp. 1996).
23. Heins v. Webster County, 250 Neb. 750, 757, 552 N.W.2d 51, 55 (1996). See KE.
TON ET. AL., supra note 4, § 58; 3 SPEiSER ET. AL., supra note 5, § 14:3.
1997]
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
A. Policy Reasons
Jurisdictions retaining common law categories advance various
reasons for doing so. One rationale is that the categories are en-
trenched in our common law and should not be changed on judicial
whim.24 It is also suggested that the categories promote judicial cer-
tainty by establishing predictable allocations of liability.25 Some fear
that abrogation of the categories and adoption of one standard of care
will eliminate the security that the categories provide for landowners
and occupiers. Along this line, it has been argued that "the single
standard will hardly be a simplification, but an enigma masked in an
elusive generalization, so broad, that there are no articulated excep-
tions."26 Jurisdictions that retain the categories also point to the judi-
ciary's ability to carve out exceptions to the rigid common law rules.27
Additionally, some courts fear giving too much power to juries,28 while
others consider the matter one that is best resolved through legisla-
tive efforts.29
A number of reasons for abandoning the status categories also ex-
ist. One reason often advanced is that the numerous judicial excep-
tions to the common law rules have resulted in confusion and
complexity.3o This complexity erodes any judicial certainty the cate-
gories may promote because it is difficult to determine when an excep-
tion might be created or applied. Some argue that the common law
rules developed during a time of feudal landed estates, and such laws
are no longer beneficial in our modern society.31 A further argument
is that reasonable people do not vary their conduct based on the status
of the entrant, and thus a reasonable standard of care under the cir-
cumstances should apply.8 2 It should be noted that when the common
law rules are abandoned in one form or another, the status of the en-
24. See Yalowizer v. Huskey Oil Co., 629 P.2d 465 (Wyo. 1981); KEETON ET. AL., supra
note 4, § 58.
25. Heins v. Webster County, 250 Neb. 750, 757, 552 N.W.2d 51,55 (1996); 3 SPEISER
ET. AL., supra note 5, § 14:3.
26. Basso v. Miller, 352 N.E.2d 868, 876 (N.Y. 1976)(Breitel, J., concurring).
27. See Heins v. Webster County, 250 Neb. 750, 757, 552 N.W.2d 51, 55 (1996); 3
SPEISER ET. AL., supra note 5, § 14:3. See generally Vitauts M. Gulbis, Annota-
tion, Modern Status of Rules Conditioning Landowner's Liability Upon Status of
Injured Party as Invitee, Licensee, or Trespasser, 22 A.LR.4th 294 (1983).
28. See 2 HARPER & JArAEs, supra note 12, § 15; Carl S. Hawkins, Premises Liability
After Repudiation of the Status Categories: Allocation of Judge and Jury Func-
tions, 1981 UTAH L. REv. 15, 63.
29. 3 SPEISER ET AL., supra note 5, § 14:3.
30. Kermarec v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 358 U.S. 625, 631 (1959);
Rowland v. Christian, 443 P.2d 561, 567 (Cal. 1968).
31. Kermarec v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 358 U.S. 625, 630 (1959); 2
HARPER & JAHEs, supra note 12, § 27.1; PAGE, supra note 12, § 6.1.
32. Rowland v. Christian, 443 P.2d 561, 568 (Cal. 1968); Mounsey v. Ellard, 297
N.E.2d 43, 51 (Mass. 1973).
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trant remains a relevant factor in determining the liability of the
landowner or occupier.33 Status, however, is no longer solely determi-
native of the duty of care owed.
B. The New Nebraska Position
In Heins v. Webster County, Nebraska joined those jurisdictions
adopting the "intermediate position"-abolishing the common law dis-
tinction between licensees and invitees while retaining a separate cat-
egory for trespassers.3 4 Heins suffered an injury to his back when he
slipped on a patch of ice and fell upon the front entrance steps to Web-
ster County Hospital. Heins was at the hospital visiting his daughter,
who was employed there as the Director of Nursing. Because Heins
was paying his daughter a social visit, under existing Nebraska law he
was only a licensee entitled to only a limited duty of care, and the trial
court found for the hospital.35 Heins appealed to the Nebraska
Supreme Court, arguing that the common law status distinctions
should be abolished.
In the majority opinion written by Justice Connolly and joined by
four other justices, the supreme court reviewed the state of premises
liability law in other jurisdictions and considered the policy justifica-
tions for and against the status distinctions.36 The court essentially
traced the development of the common law status distinctions and the
changes made to the distinctions in England and various American
jurisdictions. The court then abandoned the distinction between licen-
sees and invitees, while retaining a separate classification for tres-
passers.3 7 The court listed seven factors to be considered to determine
whether the owner or occupier of land had exercised reasonable care:
(1) the foreseeability or possibility of harm; (2) the purpose for which the en-
trant entered the premises; (3) the time, manner, and circumstances under
which the entrant entered the premises; (4) the use to which the premises are
put or are expected to be put; (5) the reasonableness of the inspection, repair,
or warning; (6) the opportunity and ease of repair or correction or giving of
warning;, and (7) the burden on the land occupier and/or community in terms
of inconvenience or cost in providing adequate protection.
38
The court further emphasized that the determination of reasonable-
ness is not limited to analysis based solely on these suggested
factors.3 9
33. Gulbis, supra note 27, at 299. See Webb v. City & Borough of Sitka, 561 P.2d 731
(Alaska 1977); Rowland v. Christian, 443 P.2d 561 (Cal. 1968); Mile High Fence
Co. v. Radovich, 489 P.2d 308 (Colo. 1971); Heins v. Webster County, 250 Neb.
750, 552 N.W.2d 51 (1996); Basso v. Miller, 352 N.E.2d 868 (N.Y. 1976).
34. Heins v. Webster County, 250 Neb. 750, 761, 552 N.W.2d 51, 57 (1996).
35. Id. at 752, 552 N.W.2d at 52-53.
36. See id. at 754-59, 552 N.W.2d at 53-56.
37. Id. at 761, 552 N.W.2d at 57.
38. Id.
39. Id.
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The majority's reasoning in Heins pointed out that the instant case
"illustrates the frustration inherent in the classification scheme."'40
The court noted that had Heins been at the hospital to purchase a soft
drink or to visit a patient, he would have been an invitee subject to a
reasonable standard of care.41 Yet, because Heins was visiting an em-
ployee, he was "denied the opportunity to recover merely because of
his status at the time of the fall.'42 The court further reasoned that
modern society creates relationships not covered by the common law
status distinctions, and thus the common law categories should not be
used to shield an owner or occupier from liability.43 The majority
chose not to abrogate the trespasser distinction because "one should
not owe a duty to exercise reasonable care to those not lawfully on
one's property."44 The majority noted that the decision did not make
owners and occupiers insurers of their premises.45
The dissenting opinion in Heins, written by Justice Fahrnbruch
and joined by Justice Caporale, argued against abolition of the com-
mon law status distinctions. These justices pointed out that the ma-
jority of American jurisdictions retain the common law categories.
46
The dissent asserted that the court, in the past, had been capable of
assigning liability based on the invitee and licensee distinction 47 and
worried that the majority's opinion "socializes the use of privately
owned property" by requiring the landowner to exercise the same duty
of care to all lawful entrants.48 The dissent also objected to the major-
ity's position that required property owners to be aware of and liable
to unknown and uninvited visitors on their property, thus creating a
liability not previously found in Nebraska law.49
III. ANALYSIS
A. Rigid Application of Common Law Distinctions
The Heins decision dramatically changed Nebraska premises lia-
bility law. It was a good case in which to make such a change, as the
court was presented with the precise issue of retention or rejection of
the common law categories.50 Also, Heins illustrates the possibility of
40. Id. at 759, 552 N.W.2d at 56.
41. Id. at 760, 552 N.W.2d at 56.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 760, 552 N.W.2d at 56-57.
44. Id. at 761, 552 N.W.2d at 57.
45. Id. The majority wanted to clarify that changing the standard does not impose
liability in all circumstances.
46. Id. at 762, 552 N.W.2d at 57.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 763, 552 N.W.2d at 58.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 751, 552 N.W.2d at 52 ("The question presented is whether this court
should abolish the common-law classifications of licensee and invitee and require
[Vol. 76:184
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harsh results when applying the rigid common law rules. Under the
common law rules, two parties of different status may be on the prem-
ises at a given time, but only one would be allowed recovery. The ma-
jority in Heins pointed out that had Heins been visiting a patient or
purchasing soda from the vending machine, he would have been clas-
sified an invitee and thus owed a reasonable standard of care.51 The
hospital escaped liability for its failure to exercise reasonable care
only because Heins fell while visiting an employee. Had another visi-
tor, one on the premises to visit a patient, simultaneously fallen on the
same spot, the hospital would have been liable for any resulting
injuries. 52
This rigid application of the common law rules has led to harsh
results in previous Nebraska decisions. In Von Dollen v. Stulgies,53
the plaintiff was injured when wallboard fell on her ankle while she
was visiting the construction site of her sister's new home. The Ne-
braska Supreme Court concluded that the plaintiff was only a licensee
subject to a limited standard of care and found for the defendant.54 It
appears, however, that the plaintiffs sister, who was present at the
time of injury, had a business relationship with the defendant build-
ers and therefore would have been classified as an invitee. Thus, had
the wallboard fallen on the sister, the builders would have been liable
for negligently stacking the wallboard.55 Because the plaintiff, rather
than her sister, was injured, the builders escaped liability for their
carelessness. This rigid application denied the plaintiff the opportu-
nity to recover merely because of her status. The Heins decision cor-
rectly eliminates the common law rigidity in such situations and
allows for recovery under our modern value system.
a duty of reasonable care to all nontrespassers."). Other jurisdictions, in con-
trast, have stretched to find an opportunity to reexamine the common law status
distinctions. See, e.g., Ford v. Board of County Comm'rs., 879 P.2d 766 (N.M.
1994).
51. Heins v. Webster County, 250 Neb. 750, 760, 552 N.W.2d 51, 56 (1996). See, e.g.,
Syas v. Nebraska Methodist Hosp. Found., 209 Neb. 201, 307 N.W.2d 112 (1981).
52. This is so because a visitor on the premises to visit another patient would be
deemed an invitee under Nebraska law due to the business advantage gained by
the hospital. See Heins v. Webster County, 250 Neb. 750, 552 N.W.2d 51 (1996);
Syas v. Nebraska Methodist Hosp. Found., 209 Neb. 201, 307 N.W.2d 112 (1981).
Heins, however, was making a social visit and, under existing Nebraska law, was
given only licensee status. See Blackbird v. SDB Invs., 249 Neb. 13, 541 N.W.2d
25 (1995); Guenther v. Allgire, 228 Neb. 425, 422 N.W.2d 782 (1988); Roan v.
Bruckner, 180 Neb. 399, 143 N.W.2d 108 (1966); Von Dollen v. Stulgies, 177 Neb.
5, 128 N.W.2d 115 (1964).
53. 177 Neb. 5, 128 N.W.2d 115 (1964).
54. Id. at 12, 128 N.W.2d at 119.
55. See Neff v. Clark, 219 Neb. 521, 363 N.W.2d 925 (1985)(defining the duty of care
owed an invitee under prior Nebraska law as reasonable care to keep premises
safe for the use of the invitee).
1997/]
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
B. Defining Licensees/Invitees
The dissenting justices in Heins argued against abolition of the
common law categories, stating that courts have encountered little
trouble in the past when applying the common law status classifica-
tions.56 Upon further examination, this contention may not be wholly
accurate. Nebraska case law indicates that the historical distinction
between licensees and invitees has sometimes been unclear,57 and the
court has carved out a number of exceptions and limitations. At times
the court has confused and even stretched the terms,5 8 indicating that
adoption of the reasonable standard of care may be the best solution
for Nebraska law.
The Heins dissent cited recent Nebraska decisions defining licen-
sees and invitees as evidence of the court's ease in applying the com-
mon law rules. The dissenters referred to recent decisions defining an
invitee as a person who enters the premises of another in answer to
the express or implied invitation of the owner or occupant to conduct
business, either for the benefit of the owner or occupant or for their
mutual advantage.59 A landowner owes an invitee the duty of reason-
able care to keep the premises safe for the use of the invitee.60 The
case law defined a licensee as a person who is privileged to enter or
remain upon the premises of another by virtue of the possessor's ex-
press or implied consent, but who is not a business visitor.61 A land-
owner owes a licensee the duty not to injure by willful or wanton
negligence and to warn of hidden danger or peril known to the land-
owner but unknown or unobserved by the licensee.62
Although these definitions of status and duty seem straightforward
at first glance, a review of Nebraska law suggests considerable confu-
sion as to application of the definitions. One early problem was defin-
ing what was sufficient to constitute an "invitation." In Haley v.
Deer,68 a woman entered a tavern to use a pay telephone. After
telephoning, she used the restroom facilities provided for customers.
As she exited the restroom into a dark hallway, she missed the turn
back into the main room of the tavern, fell through an opening into the
basement, and suffered substantial injuries. The tavern owner argued
that the plaintiff had entered the tavern solely for her own conven-
ience or benefit and thus was only a licensee.64 The court, however,
56. Heins v. Webster County, 250 Neb. 750, 762, 552 N.W.2d 51, 57 (1996)(Fahrn-
bruch, J., dissenting).
57. See infra notes 63-88 and accompanying text.
58. See infra notes 63-88 and accompanying text.
59. See, e.g., McIntosh v. Omaha Pub. Sch., 249 Neb. 529, 544 N.W.2d 502 (1996).
60. See, e.g., Neff v. Clark, 219 Neb. 521, 363 N.W.2d 925 (1985).
61. See, e.g., McIntosh v. Omaha Pub. Sch., 249 Neb. 529, 544 N.W.2d 502 (1996).
62. See, e.g., Blackbird v. SDB Invs., 249 Neb. 13, 541 N.W.2d 25 (1995).
63. 135 Neb. 459, 282 N.W. 389 (1938).
64. Id. at 461, 282 N.W.2d at 391.
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found the plaintiff to be an invitee, seemingly relying on reasoning
that the owner of the tavern implicitly "invited" the plaintiff to make
use of the business premises by opening them to the public.65 Thus,
the plaintiff was subject to a reasonable standard of care and was al-
lowed recovery.
The court attempted to further define "invitation" in Lindelow v.
Peter Kiewit Sons' JnC. 6 6 In Lindelow, the plaintiff was seriously in-
jured when he dove into a lake operated by his employer. The lake
was created and maintained by the employer, and use of the lake was
resticted to employees only. The plaintiff argued he was an invitee, as
the employer had expressly (via letter) invited all of the employees to
use the lake and its facilities.67
The court stated that a regular invitation may produce either a
licensee relationship or an invitee relationship.68 The real difference
lies in the purpose of the invitation.6 9 If the purpose relates to the
business of the owner or occupier or for the parties' mutual business
advantage, then the party receiving the invitation is classified as an
invitee. Otherwise, the party receiving the invitation is a mere licen-
see. 70 Because use of the lake was not mutually advantageous to the
business interests of the parties, the plaintiff was classified as a licen-
see and was denied recovery.7 1
The licensee/invitee word game is further illustrated by Presho v.
J.M. McDonald Co.7 2 In Presho, the plaintiff, with the store man-
ager's permission, went into the back room of a store to retrieve a box
for a frame she had purchased elsewhere. While in the back room, she
slipped and suffered injury. The court ruled that while the plaintiff
was in the front of the store, where merchandise was on display, she
was an invitee.73 Once she entered the back room of the store, how-
ever, she was "on an errand personal to herself, not in any way con-
65. Id. at 465, 282 N.W.2d at 392.
66. 174 Neb. 1, 115 N.W.2d 776 (1962).
67. Id. at 11-12, 115 N.W.2d at 782-83. The court found that
[tihe letters, which plaintiffs counsel treats as invitations making the
plaintiff an invitee, appear to welcome the employees to make use of the
premises but in none of them is any suggestion that they are urged to
use them or that the use of the facilities is particularly sought or desired
by the defendant.
Id. at 13, 115 N.W.2d at 783.
68. Id. at 9, 115 N.W.2d at 781.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Lindelow v. Peter Kiewit Sons', Inc., 174 Neb. 1, 13, 115 N.W.2d 776, 783 (1962).
72. 181 Neb. 840, 151 N.W.2d 451 (1967).
73. Id. at 843, 151 N.W.2d at 454 ("In the store proper, merchandise was displayed to
attract plaintiffs attention, and she could not be expected to constantly observe
the floor as she moved along the aisles. There can be no question that while
plaintiff was in the portion of the store where merchandise was displayed and
sold, she was an invitee.").
1997]
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
nected with the business of the defendant."74 Thus she was only a
licensee.
The Presho court apparently ignored the plaintiffs testimony ex-
plaining that she entered the store to make a purchase and retrieve a
box.75 Nor did the court consider that a ladies restroom was located in
the back room area.76 The presence of a restroom in the back area of
the store is particularly relevant as any customer in the store who
made a purchase and then used the restroom would have been deemed
an invitee.77 Because the store knew that the restroom would be used
by customers, it was reasonable to expect that the back room area
would be kept safe. The store only escaped liability for its negligence
because it happened to be the plaintiff and not a "paying" customer
who fell. Applying the Heins duty of reasonable care to lawful en-
trants eliminates from Nebraska law this absurd classification and
thus is a beneficial change.
Presho78 is also interesting in that the majority found that Haley v.
Deer79 was "not in any way analogous to"80 the instant case. That
assertion seemingly is based on the court's emphasis in PreshoSl that
the plaintiff in HaleyS2 used a pay telephone, from which the tavern
owner derived a small revenue. This created a mutual business ad-
vantage, and therefore the plaintiff was classified as an invitee and
was allowed recovery. Yet, the actual Haley opinion83 contained one
line regarding the pay telephone.e4 The rest of the opinion apparently
was based on the "implied invitation" reasoning.85 This wavering, or
perhaps rereasoning, suggests that the court indeed had substantial
difficulties in accurately delineating between licensees and invitees.
This brief review of Nebraska law indicates that application of the
common law status distinctions has been neither easy nor predictable.
74. Id. at 843-44, 151 N.W.2d at 454.
75. Id. at 841, 151 N.W.2d at 453.
76. Id. at 845, 151 N.W.2d at 455 (McCown, J., dissenting)("There was evidence here
that: '... we have a thousand people go back there to our restrooms a month.'").
The majority opinion, in contrast, found that "[w]hile the testimony indicates
that a ladies' restroom was located in this area, this fact was unknown to her and
its use was not the purpose of her trip, so on the facts in this case it is immate-
rial." Id. at 844, 151 N.W.2d at 454-55.
77. Id.
78. Presho v. J.M. McDonald Co., 181 Neb. 840, 151 N.W.2d 451 (1967).
79. 135 Neb. 459, 282 N.W. 389 (1938).
80. Presho v. J.M. McDonald Co., 181 Neb. 840, 844, 151 N.W.2d 451, 455 (1967).
81. See id.
82. Haley v. Deer, 135 Neb. 459, 282 N.W. 389 (1938).
83. Id.
84. Id. at 460-61, 282 N.W. at 390 ("However, she decided to telephone to a relative
first to come for her, as it was about 6 o'clock in the evening, and went on to the
Gold Dust Tavern for that purpose. The defendant, Deer, gets 25 per cent of the
excess tolls above $5.50 a month from this pay telephone in his tavern.").
85. See supra notes 66-85 and accompanying text.
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Historically, the court has struggled to determine classifications in dif-
ficult situations8 6 and has doggedly retained the categories in situa-
tions where their application seemed harsh.87 Because the common
law categories are so difficult to apply, it appears that abolition of the
categories and adoption of one reasonable standard of care may be the
best solution for modem Nebraska law.
C. Social Guests
While some jurisdictions have stretched to find social guests to be
invitees subject to a reasonable standard of care,88 Nebraska always
has defined social guests as licensees.89 The longevity of this classifi-
cation fails to make it logical, however. Perhaps a simple example will
illustrate the point. Suppose two families live as neighbors for ten
years. Over the years, they become friends. When one neighbor in-
vites the other neighbor into his home, under the common law that
"social guest" is owed only the limited licensee duty of care. 90 In con-
trast, however, if one neighbor invited an insurance salesperson to his
home, a person he had never even met, that unknown salesperson is
owed a general duty of reasonable care.91 This simple illustration
raises the question-why should one owe a lesser duty to a friend than
to a stranger?92 Because the social guest licensee classification is il-
logical in modem society, adoption of one reasonable standard of care
is preferable.
D. What About Trespassers?
The Heins decision expressly retained the separate status classifi-
cation for trespassers because "one should not owe a duty to exercise
reasonable care to those not lawfully on one's property."93 Although
England and a number of American jurisdictions have similarly cho-
sen to abrogate only the invitee and licensee common law distinc-
86. See McIntosh v. Omaha Pub. Sch., 249 Neb. 529, 544 N.W.2d 502 (1996);
Lindelow v. Peter Kiewit Sons', Inc., 174 Neb. 1, 115 N.W.2d 776 (1962); Haley v.
Deer, 135 Neb. 459, 282 N.W. 389 (1938).
87. See Presho v. J.M. McDonald Co., 181 Neb. 840, 151 N.W.2d 451 (1967); Von
Dollen v. Stulgies, 177 Neb. 5, 128 N.W.2d 115 (1964).
88. See supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text.
89. See Blackbird v. SDB Invs., 249 Neb. 13, 541 N.W.2d 25 (1995); Guenther v.
Allgire, 228 Neb. 425, 422 N.W.2d 782 (1988); Lindelow v. Peter Kiewit Sons',
Inc., 174 Neb. 1, 115 N.W.2d 776 (1962)(discussing the purpose requirement of an
invitation).
90. PAGE, supra note 12, § 3.6.
91. This is so because under the "economic benefit" or "mutual benefit" theory of the
invitee classification, the insurance salesperson enters for a purpose directly or
indirectly connected with the business dealings of the salesperson and the posses-
sor of the property. See PAGE:, supra note 12, § 4.2.
92. See Antoniewicz v. Reszcynski, 236 N.W.2d 1 (Wis. 1974).
93. Heins v. Webster County, 250 Neb. 750, 761, 552 N.W.2d 51, 57 (1996).
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tions, 94 maintaining a separate category for trespassers may be ill-
advised for modern premises liability law.
Of course, one reason the Nebraska Supreme Court may have de-
clined to change the trespasser rule is because it was not asked to do
so. The question presented in Heins was "whether this court should
abolish the common-law classifications of licensee and invitee and re-
quire a duty of reasonable care to all nontrespassers."95 Simply by
exercising judicial restraint, the court could have passed on the issue
of trespassers and perhaps intended to do so. The court, however,
briefly considered the issue of trespassers in its opinion,9 6 but ex-
pressly refused to abrogate the trespasser category.
97
The court offered two reasons for refusing to abrogate the status
classification for trespassers. First, the law should not restrict the
free use of land by requiring landowners to expect or anticipate a tres-
passer's presence. 98 Second, a trespasser, unlike an invitee or a licen-
see, enters under no claim of right and thus should not be subject to
extended protection.99 Other jurisdictions also offer these basic rea-
sons for retaining the trespasser category.oo The reasons, however,
fail to support retention of the category.
The first reason, the contention that a landowner would be unfairly
burdened by a duty to anticipate trespassers, is unjustified. It must
be remembered that the duty owed under the ordinary standard of
care is to take care to avoid foreseeable, unreasonable risks.10 1 Under
Heins, the status categories of invitee and licensee are still relevant in
determining foreseeability.102 The status of a trespasser also should
be only a factor in the foreseeability of the harm and not solely deter-
minative of the duty owed. Under this method, if the presence of a
trespasser is entirely unforeseeable, a landowner will neither violate
the standard of care nor be unduly burdened. Furthermore, under
Heins, a landowner is not an insurer of the premises, but is obligated
only to take reasonable precautions.los Heins expressly lists a
number of factors that the jury can consider when determining
94. England abolished the distinctions via the Occupiers Liability Act of 1957, 5 & 6
Eliz. 2, ch. 31 (Eng.). For an overview of the effects of and reasons behind this
Act, see Payne, supra note 16. For a list of American jurisdictions abolishing the
distinction between licensees and invitees, but retaining a separate category for
trespassers, see supra note 20.
95. Heins v. Webster County, 250 Neb. 750, 751, 552 N.W.2d 51, 52 (1996).
96. Id. at 755-56, 761, 552 N.W.2d at 54, 57.
97. Id. at 761, 552 N.W.2d at 57.
98. Id. at 755, 552 N.W.2d at 54.
99. Id.
100. See supra note 20.
101. See generally RIcHARD A. EPSTEIN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS (6th ed.
1995).
102. Heins v. Webster County, 250 Neb. 750, 761, 552 N.W.2d 51, 57 (1996).
103. Id.
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whether an owner or occupier has exercised a duty of care.104 While
hindsight may provide an argument that further precautions would
have been more reasonable in a given situation,O5 this hardly sub-
stantiates a claim that the landowner is "unfairly burdened" by hav-
ing to exercise reasonable care to trespassers. Indeed, in many
situations, the conduct necessary to satisfy a reasonable standard of
care for invitees and licensees will sufficiently satisfy a reasonable
standard of care for trespassers.106
The second reason offered by the court for retaining the trespasser
distinction is that a trespasser by definition does not enter the prem-
ises under any color of right.107 While true,1Os this fails to justify de-
nying a trespasser the protections of general negligence law.
Concededly, a trespasser is a wrongdoer. Nevertheless, if a trespasser
is exposed to unreasonable risk of harm on a landowner's property, the
potential harm to the trespasser far outweighs the potential risk of
harm to the landowner arising from the trespass.109 A minor invasion
of a property interest should not cause one to be deemed unworthy of
humane treatment in today's society.110
The various kinds of trespassers rigidly classified under the com-
mon law rule further emphasize the disparate treatment of trespass-
ers under the common law scheme. Under the common law definition
of trespasser, the question of whether the entry was intentional, negli-
gent, or purely accidental is immaterial.",1 Thus, many "technical"
trespasses are relatively innocent. It is unfair to punish technical
wrongdoers by subjecting them to risks of unreasonable harm. Our
modem society should recognize that "[a] man's life or limb does not
become less worthy of protection by the law nor a loss less worthy of
compensation under the law because he has come upon the land of
another without permission."112
The maintenance of a separate category for trespassers also fails to
serve the purpose the Heins court wished to achieve. 113 In fact, the
court contradicts itself in its holding:
104. Id.
105. See generally James Fleming, Jr., Tort Liability of Occupiers of Land: Duties
Owed to Trespassers, 63 YALE L.J. 144 (1953).
106. Rowland v. Christian, 443 P.2d 561, 567 (Cal. 1968).
107. Heins v. Webster County, 250 Neb. 750, 755, 552 N.W.2d 51, 54 (1996).
108. RESTATEmENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 329 (1965Xdefining a trespasser as "a person
who enters or remains upon land in the possession of another without a privilege
to do so created by the possessor's consent or otherwise").
109. See Fleming, supra note 105, at 152-53.
110. Id. at 153.
111. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs § 329 cmt. c (1965).
112. Rowland v. Christian, 443 P.2d 561, 568 (Cal. 1968).
113. The Heins court discussed various reasons for abrogating the distinction between
licensees and invitees. First, it wished to eliminate the "frustrations inherent in
the classification scheme." Heins v. Webster County, 250 Neb. 750, 759, 552
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We conclude that we should eliminate the distinction between licensees and
invitees by requiring a standard of reasonable care for all lawful visitors. We
retain a separate classification for trespassers because we conclude that one
should not owe a duty to exercise reasonable care to those not lawfully on
one's property. Adopting this rule places the focus where it should be, on the
foreseeability of the injury, rather than on allowing the duty in a particular
case to be determined by the status of the person who enters upon the
property.1 1
4
Immediately after retaining a separate category based on status for
trespassers, the court acknowledged that the correct focus is not on
status, but on foreseeability. Thus, the court itself provided evidence
that maintaining a separate category for trespassers is illogical and
fails to achieve the purpose of extending the principles of general neg-
ligence law to owners and occupiers of land. Foreseeability of the
harm, not status of the entrant, should be the prevailing factor in
premises liability law.115
Not only is maintaining the trespasser category illogical and unre-
lated to the purpose the Heins court wished to achieve, it also further
contributes to the confusion inherent in the common law classification
system. Retaining the trespasser exception "tends to perpetuate,
although on a smaller scale, the kind of tradition-bound and mistaken
analysis that... the court was aiming to correct."116 This, in turn,
forces courts to make the same rigid classifications necessary under
the common law rules.1 17 This places on courts a heavy burden to
distinguish between trespassers and nontrespassers.
Under Heins, an entrant upon land will be entitled to a duty of
reasonable care unless the entrant is deemed a trespasser.3-s If clas-
sified as a trespasser, the landowner will owe the entrant only the
very limited duty not to willfully or wantonly injure.119 There is a
significant discrepancy between these standards of care, and in a close
N.W.2d 51, 56 (1996). Second, it wanted to avoid the practice of continuing to
"pigeonhole" individual entrants into a status category. Id. at 760, 552 N.W.2d at
56. Third, the court found "the common-law status classifications should not be
able to shield those who would otherwise be held liable to a standard of reason-
able care but for the arbitrary classification of the visitor.... ." Id. at 760, 552
N.W.2d at 57.
114. Id. at 761, 552 N.W.2d at 57 (emphasis added).
115. Nearly every jurisdiction abolishing the common law distinctions in one form or
another accepts this basic contention. For a list of jurisdictions that have altered
the categories, see supra notes 19-22.
116. Mounsey v. Ellard, 297 N.E.2d 43, 57 (Mass. 1973)(Kaplan, J., concurring).
117. Id. See Edward A. Strenkowski, Tort Liability of Owners and Possessors of
Land-A Single Standard of Reasonable Care Under the Circumstances Towards
Invitees and Licensees, 33 Aex. L. REv. 194 (1979).
118. See Heins v. Webster County, 250 Neb. 750, 552 N.W.2d 51 (1996).
119. See Bosilievac v. Ready Mixed Concrete Co., 182 Neb. 199, 153 N.W.2d 864
(1967); Maloepszy v. Central Mkt., 143 Neb. 356, 9 N.W.2d 474 (1943); Haley v.
Deer, 135 Neb. 459, 282 N.W. 389 (1938). Nebraska requires that two criteria be
met for conduct to be willful and wanton: the defendant must have actual knowl-
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case, the distinction will be determinative. An example of a Nebraska
case involving questions of whether entrants were licensees or tres-
passers may illustrate the point.12 0
In 1985, several teenage boys were killed when a cave in which
they were camping collapsed. The survivors of two brothers killed in
the accident brought a wrongful death action against the owner of the
premises. Evidence showed that the boys had camped in the cave for
as many as two years prior to the accident. The landowner was aware
that people entered his cave and that the ceiling occasionally col-
lapsed. "No trespassing" signs were posted on the premises, but the
owner knew the signs were ignored. Based on these facts, the court
classified the brothers as licensees.121 However, in Terry v. Metz-
ger,'22 another case arising out of the same accident, the district court
concluded, arguably based on the same facts, that another boy injured
in the collapse was only a trespasser.123
These same status distinctions, under Heins, would cause a grossly
unjust result. As licensees, the two brothers would be entitled to a
reasonable standard of care,124 and their survivors undoubtedly
would recover under the facts presented. The boy classified as a tres-
passer, however, would not recover because the duty owed to him
would remain the same-to refrain from willful and wanton injury.' 2 5
Thus, although both parties were involved in the same accident, one
party would recover and the other would not.126 Yet, if the traditional
trespasser category was abolished, the critical distinction between li-
censee and trespasser would not be solely determinative in this situa-
tion. Rather, a general duty of reasonable care would be applied,127
and the court could rightly consider all of the circumstances in the
identical situations.
At least one jurisdiction asserts that the trespasser category
should be retained because exceptions to the trespasser category ame-
edge of the danger and intentionally fail to prevent harm that was reasonably
likely to result. Terry v. Metzger, 241 Neb. 795, 799, 491 N.W.2d 50, 54 (1992).
120. The facts are adapted from Wiles v. Metzger, 238 Neb. 943, 473 N.W.2d 113
(1991).
121. Wiles v. Metzger, 238 Neb. 943, 956, 473 N.W.2d 113, 122 (1991).
122. Terry v. Metzger, 241 Neb. 795, 491 N.W.2d 50 (1992).
123. Id. at 798, 491 N.W.2d at 53.
124. See Heins v. Webster County, 250 Neb. 750, 552 N.W.2d 51 (1996).
125. See supra note 120.
126. Allowing one party to recover while the other does not serves to further illustrate
the rigidness of the common law rules, as discussed supra text accompanying
notes 36-45. Failing to eliminate the trespasser category thus returns the court
back to what it is trying to avoid-"the frustration inherent in the classification
scheme." Heins v. Webster County, 250 Neb. 750, 759, 552 N.W.2d 51, 56 (1996).
127. See Heins v. Webster County, 250 Neb. 750, 552 N.W.2d 51 (1996).
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liorate the harshness of the common law rules.12 8 These subclassifica-
tions of trespassers, however, are nothing more than an attempt to
recognize that certain classes of trespassers are entitled to a greater
standard of care. This illustrates the benefit of applying a general
standard of care instead of creating fictional subclassifications.
One Nebraska subclassification is the attractive nuisance doctrine,
which developed to protect trespassing children.1 2 9 Nebraska recog-
nized and adopted3o the Restatement (Second) of Torts version of the
attractive nuisance doctrine.i13 The apparent reason for creating a
subclassffication for children was due to the child's immaturity and
the child's inability to anticipate danger and take precautions while
trespassing. 132 Policymakers attempted to balance a landowner's
right to use his property as he pleased against society's special inter-
est in preserving the welfare of children.3S3 The attractive nuisance
doctrine is a step in the right direction of requiring a reasonable stan-
dard of care, but it falls short of achieving the policy objective. The
needs and values of modern society would best be protected by a Ne-
braska law that applied a reasonable standard of care to all entrants
upon land. Modern society values the whole population, not just the
welfare of children. All categories of trespassers, whether children or
adults, should be subject to a reasonable standard of care under the
circumstances.
128. O'Leary v. Coenen, 251 N.W.2d 746, 751 n.6 (N.D. 1977)("Exceptions to the tres-
passer category are few in number and are already well developed in North Da-
kota case law.").
129. See generally KETN ET. AL., supra note 4, § 59.
130. Nebraska adopted the Restatement (Second) of Torts version of the attractive
nuisance doctrine in Gubalke v. Anther's Estate, 189 Neb. 385, 202 N.W.2d 836
(1972).
131. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF ToRTs § 339 (1965):
Artificial Conditions Highly Dangerous to Trespassing Children
A possessor of land is subject to liability for physical harm to children
trespassing thereon caused by an artificial condition upon the land if
(a) the place where the condition exists is one upon which the posses-
sor knows or has reason to know that children are likely to trespass, and
(b) the condition is one of which the possessor knows or has reason to
know and which he realizes or should realize will involve an unreasona-
ble risk of death or serious bodily harm to such children, and
(c) the children because of their youth do not discover the condition
or realize the risk involved in intermeddling with it or in coming within
the area made dangerous by it, and
(d) the utility to the possessor of maintaining the condition and the
burden of eliminating the danger are slight as compared with the risk to
children involved, and
(e) the possessor fails to exercise reasonable care to eliminate the
danger or otherwise to protect the children.
132. See KpmroN ET. AL., supra note 4, § 59.
133. Id.
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E. Effect Heis Will Have on Nebraska Law
The Heins decision will impact Nebraska law both theoretically
and practically. The theoretical implications of the decision have been
the primary focus of this Note. The practical effects of the decision
should also be considered, for the decision may strike fear into the
hearts of property owners and attorneys accustomed to living and
practicing under the common law rules.
Our system of law generally subscribes to the precept that ques-
tions of law are determined by a judge, while questions of fact are de-
termined by a jury.134 History has demonstrated that any rule of
substantive law or procedure that enlarges the power of juries tends to
extend liability.' 35 The Heins decision essentially shifted a great deal
of power away from the judge by enabling the jury to use the enumer-
ated factors to determine whether a reasonable standard of care has
been violated. This shift in the law may cause some to fear an in-
crease in the number of cases in which owners and occupiers are found
liable for injuries occurring on their land.
However, the factors listed by the court in Heins should limit liabil-
ity of owners and occupiers, thereby dispelling the fears of landowners
and their attorneys. The factors provide a framework for determining
reasonable care under the circumstances; in turn, this framework can
be used by both juries and owners and occupiers of land. While a jury
will use the factors to evaluate after the fact, landowners can be
guided by the factors and take reasonable precautions before any lia-
bility questions arise. Also, the factors themselves limit the liability of
owners and occupiers by forcing the jury to consider the foreseeability
of the harm136 in light of the reason the entrant was on the premises
and under the circumstances (purpose, time, place, and manner) the
visitor entered the premises.13 7 Furthermore, the jury must consider
the owner or occupier's attempts to warn, the ordinary use of the
premises, and the burden on the landowner or occupier in taking fur-
ther precautions in terms of inconvenience or cost.' 3 8 These consider-
ations provide substantial protection of the owner or occupier's
interest and do not expose the owner or occupier to undue liability. An
owner or occupier simply must be able to demonstrate that a reason-
able effort was made to protect the visitor from harm under the
circumstances.
In addition, one comprehensive study indicates that overruling the
common law status categories has not resulted in wholesale abandon-
134. EpsTEIN, supra note 101, at 275.
135. 2 HAnPER & JAMEs, supra note 12, § 15.5.
136. Heins v. Webster County, 250 Neb. 750, 761, 552 N.W.2d 51, 57 (1996).
137. Id.
138. Id.
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ment of premises liability cases to jury discretion.139 Furthermore,
while the jury generally determines whether conduct is reasonable,
under certain circumstances the court can refuse to submit the issue
of reasonableness to the jury.140 The court can, as a matter of law,
rule that a party's conduct was reasonable under the circumstances
and deny the jury's consideration of the Heins factors. Abolition of the
status categories, even of all three categories, thus will not extend lia-
bility to landowners if juries accurately apply the Heins factors and
judges exercise care in deciding whether there is sufficient evidence of
negligence to submit the issue to the jury.14 1
IV. CONCLUSION
The Heins decision eliminates the common law status distinction
between licensees and invitees and requires that a duty of reasonable
care be applied to all but trespassers upon land. This approach has
been followed by a number of American jurisdictions and is a benefi-
cial change in Nebraska law. To fully eliminate the flaws of the com-
mon law classification system, however, the trespasser category also
should be abrogated.
Complete abrogation of the common law status categories is consis-
tent with our modem societal values. It must be remembered that the
common law categories developed during a time in which the only par-
ties affected by a lawsuit were the plaintiff and the defendant, and any
finding of tort liability directly (and adversely) affected the defend-
ant's pocketbook. Thus, perhaps it was justifiable to focus the issue on
the status of the parties so that only the party most "morally blame-
worthy" suffered the consequences. 142 Today, however, the plaintiff
and defendant are no longer the only parties involved in a lawsuit due
to widespread liability insurance. The existence of liability insurance
spreads costs over a large population43 and eliminates the need to
draw rigid lines of liability classification.
Whether only the licensee and invitee categories are abrogated or
whether trespassers are also exempt from the common law categories,
the fear that liability of owners and occupiers will be extended is un-
founded. Heins specifically lists a number of factors that juries and
landowners can consider in assessing whether reasonable care was ex-
ercised. Trial judges, of course, retain the discretion to decline sub-
mitting questions of negligence to the jury. In sum, Heins was a step
in the right direction as it ushered into Nebraska law the idea that
139. Hawkins, supra note 28, at 61.
140. 2 HARPER & JAMEs, supra note 12, § 15.3.
141. Hawkins, supra note 28, at 63.
142. 2 HARPER & JAms, supra note 12, § 13.2.
143. Id. § 13.4.
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modem social values should take precedence over ancient terminol-
ogy. That idea is the lasting benefit of the Heis decision.
Kristin K Woodward '98
